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LAMA ABU ODEH*

The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: The
Limits of Liberal Political Science and CLS
Analysis of Law Elsewheret
On January 25th 2011, following a popular uprising, president
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was forced to relinquishpower after thirty
years of continuous rule. The popular uprising came to be known as
the Egyptian revolution of January25th marking the first time in the
modern history of Egypt an authoritarianruler is forced out of power
through the mobilization of Egyptian masses. The popular mobilization came at the heels of several years of "wildcat" workers' strikes
affecting various sectors of the economy, public and private, as well as
recurring demonstrations spearheaded by the youth of the Egyptian
middle class demanding civil and political rights and protesting the
intrusive rule of security. This Article discusses the role the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt played in framing through its
jurisprudence the economic and political picture in the two decades
preceding the revolution and that arguably contributed to the precipitation of the events leading up to the revolution.
The SCC itself was not immune to the intrusive reach of the reign
of "security"of Mubarak's authoritarianrule even though the regime
supported the court's autonomy in the early years of its adjudication.
While the SCC facilitated the transition to "neoliberalism" as the
Mubarak regime had hoped it would, it also took the regime by surprise both by its sometimes extreme libertarianapproach to economic
issues as well as its liberal(izing)jurisprudence on the political side,
creatingserious dilemmas for the regime. Gradually,the composition
of the court was modified to ease off the bite of the jurisprudence the
court developed in the 1990s.
Egypt is now going through a constitutionaltransition.On March
19, 2011, Egyptians approved a number of constitutionalamendments
that would allow for the first post-Mubarak democratic elections to be
held in November of 2011. In the aftermath of the elections, a commission will be formed to draft a new constitution commemorating the
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event of revolution. A referendum will take place to vote on the new
constitution.
The fate of the SCC with its current organizing law and membership' remain uncertain. What a constitutional court in a postrevolutionary context, in which politicalpractice is free and ideologies
"run wild" without the constraintof security, would look like remains
to be seen. How much of the SCC's jurisprudence carries over to the
new era also remains an open question.
The Article was written before the revolution took place. I will preserve its pre-revolution time-voice and hope that the readertreats it as
a piece on the "intellectual history" of law, judges, and jurisprudence
in Egypt in the decades leading up to revolution.
INTRODUCTION

This Article is an attempt to provide a "thick" analysis of an instance of constitutionalism elsewhere. The instance is that of the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) in
its heyday in the 1990s characterized by the court's robust attempt to
bring about a double liberalization through its jurisprudence: one of
the economy and one of politics. While it was the previous authoritarian regime of Mubarak that empowered the court to perform
precisely these tasks: to assume the blame for the shift to neoliberalism in the economy, as well as to "loosen" the political sphere so that
the "pain" from liberalization can take some form of political expression, 2 the earnestness and enthusiasm of the SCC surprised the
regime. The SCC's 1990s jurisprudence surpassed the limit of liberalization the regime was willing to tolerate, leading eventually to the
replacement of the Chief Justice of the court with a regime insider.
This Article argues that the court's neo-liberalizing decisions of
the period, extreme and uncompromising in some instances, as well
as the unfolding struggle for its autonomy in the face of an intrusive
authoritarian regime created a surprising trade-off in positions between the regime and the left. The left traded-off its conventional
concern over distributional outcome for one over "the rule of law" intensifying thereby its faith in, and attachment to, the latter,
1. Article 175 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 provides, "The Supreme Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws and regulations, interprets
legislative provisions, all according to the law. The law regulates the other areas of
jurisdiction of the court and the procedures followed in the trial of cases before it." See
the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971. English translation available
at http://www.sis.gov.egfEn/LastPage.aspx?CategoryjD=208 (last visited July 30,
2011). Law No. 48, Year 1979 regulates the affairs of the Supreme Constitutional
Court, including the appointment and nomination of its Chief Justice and member
Justices.
2. See TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW,
POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007).
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ironically leaving concern over distributive outcome to the regime in
the name of "law and order" or "security considerations." This trade
off occurred as a result of, on the one side, the selective use of the
court by a good number of human rights organizations to push for
doctrinal transformation in areas they read would be agreeable to an
overall liberalizing court and then rallying behind the court when its
autonomy was threatened by the regime, and on the other, the serious threat to the revenue stream of the regime that the relentless
neo-liberalizing of the economy by the court was creating, undermining its capacity to manage the outcome of such liberalization.
Complicating the picture, the Article argues that in lieu of "ideology" as the form in which distributional concerns are typically
rationalized and legitimated, "law and order/security" has become the
form in which such concerns are not so much legitimated as managed
in the neoliberal era. This has serious analytical consequences for our
understanding of the behavior of a court that adjudicated against a
background of security-in-lieu-of-ideology. Such a court could only act
politically no matter how technocratic or formalist its judicial decisions may have appeared. Absent ideology, the distance between
politics and law is a very short one.
If we add the court to the trade-off of positions described above,
we find ourselves confronting a very unfamiliar situation particularly
if we have the comparative case of the United States in mind: the
regime concerned with distribution in the name of "law and order,"
the left preoccupied with the "rule of law" at the expense of distribution, and the court acting openly politically behind the thin veil of its
technocratic legal language.
The Article further argues that this triangular trade-off is left
analytically unaccounted for by a liberal legal and political science
discussion of the court because of this literature's normative sympathy to the double liberalizing project of the court: introducing market
and democracy through constitutional interpretation is a rightful
project, according to this literature, that should be applauded. A form
of conceptual glibness about distributional outcomes for marginalized
social groups therefore ensues and an inability to note them analytically especially in the positions of the primary actors.
On the other side, the trade-off raises questions for someone who
is interested in knocking down faith in the "rule of law" from the CLS
perspective. This is so because of the confusion produced by this
trade-off: putting faith in the rule of law on the side of the left which
in the context of the United States, home of the CLS critique, is the
very agent of critique of such faith, and the concern for distribution
on the side of an authoritarian regime, typically the concern of the
left, and the absence of the category of "ideology" to separate the
court's legal reasoning from political influence, and its displacement
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by the category of "security"-a situation starkly different from that
of the United States where judges are beholden to the faith in the
rule of law with a background of ideological influence.
The Article is divided into three parts:
Part One provides a representation of the dynamic interaction between the Court, the political left and the regime that accounts for
the trade-off, with an implicit critique of the representation adopted
by political science of such a dynamic.
Part Two provides an argument for the limits of the use of CLS analysis to understand this dynamic. I argue that the shift in the roles/
positions makes critique superfluous. More specifically, I argue that
the absence of "ideology" and its displacement by "security considerations" means the main problem for judges is not "indeterminacy," but
rather the influence of the security forces, i.e., the lack of judicial
autonomy.
Part Three provides a historical account of the political economy of
Egypt to explain the shift from ideology to security. I argue that
Egypt has moved from an ideology of nationalist socialism to the nonideology of "security plus rentierism 3 " as a result of the failure of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)4 and its displacement by
3. Rentierism refers to an orientation in the political economy of a state whereby
the state derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of
indigenous resources to international clients. The sources of rent in the case Egypt
are: the sale of natural gas in international market, rent collected through use of the
Suez Canal by international shipments, and USAID in which Egypt rents its geostrategic location to the United States. See HAZEM BEBLAWI & GIAComo LucANI, THE
RENTIER STATE (1987).
Because the rent collected by the state from such resources is high given the
"strategic" value attached to the product being sold (natural gas, Suez canal, geostrategic location) and because the state under these circumstances deploys a minimal of
its national labor to extract such resources, the state expends the rent on its nationals
as bounty rather than as reward for labor. The rentier state relates to its citizens
through the non-ideological relation of reward and gratitude (empty ideology) while
the coercive state is tied to its citizens through the empty but heavy relationship of
the coercion of terror. In the neoliberal era the Egyptian regime was tied to its citizens through the combined ideological vaccum of coercion and rentierism. See NAZIH
Avum, OVERSTATING THE ARAB STATE 228 (1995).
4. ISI is a development strategy based on introducing industrialization within a
particular national territory by structuring a subsidy and tariff system aiming at protecting local infant industries from the competition of industrial imports. The strategy
is based on reorienting rural labor to cities and towns to engage in industrial work
and in taxing both national consumers and farmers to subsidize the emergent industrial elite and industrial working class. In effect, the consumers pay higher prices for
(initially) lower quality goods (compared to imports) and farmers selling their agricultural output at a discounted price in order to subsidize the wages the new industrial
elite is paying its nascent industrial working class. The success of the strategy depends on treating ISI as an initial stage of production to be followed by one of
competition so that the previously subsidized industrial goods are no longer protected
but are forced to compete with other industrial goods in the international market.
Failure of ISI typically denotes a situation in which the transition to the competitive
stage is never realized with the result that the social subsidy to the local industrial
class continues usually through collaboration of a corrupt political class that facilitates the stalemate in the economy and the continuation of the unjust and
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neo-liberalism. This shift has created a huge surplus of grievance
that could only be overcome by coercion of the losers and bribery of a
huge civil service through rentier money to control the edges of
discontent.
PART ONE

A.

The Heyday of the Court

The story of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) is
an interesting albeit tragic one. The court remains a working institution in Egypt, located in a spectacular building in Maadi, Cairo,
manned by elite judges who continue to churn out decisions vital to
the nation, receiving visitors interested in human rights in Egypt and
occasionally attracting newspaper headlines. Yet, one may nevertheless be justified in referring to the Court in the past tense. There was
an SCC in Egypt. The contemporary SCC seems more like a faint
shadow of its previous self, especially the one that thrived and
throbbed in the 1990s: earning the ire of the Mubarak government,
the admiration of human rights activists and political partisans of
the opposition, and the ambivalence- mixed-with-exasperation of law
professors and other members of the judiciary.5 In the 1990s SCC
was the talk of the town!
For very good reasons. The successive rulings of the court opened
up electoral candidacy, party registration, freedom of expression, and
human rights advocacy,6 creating a sense-in a country like Egypt
burdensome subsidy that enriches the few and stalls the overall development of the
economy. See James M. Cypher & James L. Dietz, The Process of Economic Development § 248-79 (3d ed. 2008).
5. The SCC was criticized by Egyptian law professors for various reasons, including, among others: its departure from the civilian legal tradition in its approach
to legal interpretation and reasoning and reorienting the source of influence to that of
American constitutional jurisprudence, ignoring the socialist orientation of the Egyptian Constitution, making strict liability in matters regulating commerce
unconstitutional, adopting an extreme attitude towards taxation by insisting on formal equality among those taxed, disrupting the attempt by the state to facilitate tax
collection, and prevention of tax evasion by declaring such attempts unconstitutional.
For a collection of articles in which these criticisms are made, see Role of the Supreme
ConstitutionalCourt in the Egyptian Legal System, First Conference for the Faculty of
Law, Helwan University, 1998.
6. For example, see Case 59, Judicial Year 18, issued Feb. 1, 1997 [SCCDC, Vol.
8, p 286], the court struck down legislation that excluded certain categories of citizens
from joining political parties and participating in political activities, since it violates
constitutional rights of multi-party system and participating in public life. The court
held that although the pertinent legislation was accepted by referendum called by the
President of Egypt, it remains inferior in rank to the Constitution; Case 37, Judicial
Year 11, issued Feb. 6, 1993 [SCCDC, Vol. 5, Part 2, p 183], on the limitation of seats
for independent candidates in the elections to the People's Assembly. The court held
that the discriminatory factors outlines in Article 40, i.e., race, ethnic origin, religion
or creed, are not comprehensive but indicative. Thus election arrangements that discriminate on basis of social or economic class, adoption of political or non-political
views, or affiliation to a particular minority group, violate the equal protection clause
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where oppositional political activity is stifled-that politics was at
last possible, only, well .. . in a roundabout kind of way: rather than
through open confrontation on the streets with the powers that be (as
in Iran),7 political life came through the courts! The SCC 's "in-yourface" rulings created among many Egyptians the sense, and a rather
paradoxical one at that, that through rule of law constitutionalism,
they were delivered the political! And by God, they wanted both: the
political and the rule of law. How amazing that they could get them
both in one irresistible package through the court, the one in the
guise of the other! "Rights" was not only the new name of politics but
also that of the rule of law. And so activists flooded the court, populating its hallways with their briefs pushing the court to push the
regime to deliver them more and more politics/rights.8
Commentators caught on, lawyers and political scientists alike.
Perusing the literature produced by both, one is impressed with the
praise it showered on the SCC.9 Both groups discuss the court admiringly, whether with regard to its stance on Islamic law

and is thus unconstitutional. In Case 2, Judicial Year 9, issued Feb. 1, 1992 [SCCDC,
Vol. 5, Part 1, p 142], the court held that legislation that arbitrarily discriminates
between individuals without objective foundations violates the equal protection principles enshrined in Article 8 and 40 of the constitution; Case 34, Judicial Year 13,
issued June 20, 1994 [Official Gazette No 27, July 7, 1994], on the unconstitutionality
of legislation interpretation that included additional conditions in Social Security
Law, which narrows the scope of pensions for various salaried workers in order to
relieve the state's financial burden; Case 44, Judicial Year 7, issued May 7, 1988
[SCCDC, Vol. 4, p 88], the court struck down legislation that prohibited the establishment of political party-the Nasserist Party-for criticizing a treaty-the peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel-due to the violation of constitutional rights of freedom of expression, multi-party system and the democratic character of the state.
Basically, all the political parties in Egypt are creations of the courts, due to a simple
fact that the Political Parties Committee, controlled by the regime, granted only the
National Democratic Party (NDP) the regime party, a license. See Joshua Stacher,
Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties,31 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD.
215, 218-22 (2004).
7. Of course, it was the confrontation on the streets with an authoritarian regime that eventually opened up the political in Egypt-January 25th revolution.
8. See Case 42, Judicial Year 11, issued May 20, 1995, dealing with freedom of
expression. The court held that criticizing public actions through the press, or other
means of expression, is a right guaranteed to every citizen and an essential principle
of democracy. On the same principles, see also Case 37, Judicial Year 11, issued Feb.
6, 1993 [SCCDC, Vol. 5, Part 2, p 183]. On the freedom of press, see Case 25, Judicial
Year 16, issued July 3, 1995 [Official Gazette No 29, 20th July 1995]. See also Case
44, supra note 6.
9. See Moustafa, supra note 2; Nathan Brown, Judicial Review and the Arab
World, 9 (4) JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 85-99 (Oct., 1998); NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE
OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997) [hereinafter
BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD]; DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND

IsLAM (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999); Clark B. Lombardi, Islamic
Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalizationof the
Sharia in Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1998); RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010).
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(secularization),1 0 or its stance on human rights (pushing the boundaries of an authoritarian regime") or its stance on economic issues
(getting the incentives right so that economic development and
growth can be triggered in Egypt1 2 ). The admiration is typically directed at the court's jurisprudence in the 1980s but especially in the
1990s, the time when the court used the autonomy it earned hard by
delivering judgments the regime was in need of (in the area of the
economy) to reign in the powers of that same regime (in the area of
civil and political rights). The regime assaulted this autonomy in the
10. See Case 8, Judicial Year 17, issued May 18, 1996 [SCCDC, Vol. 8, p 657],
dealing with the right of Muslim women to wear "niqab" (full veil), the court held that
the Minister of Education decree that prohibited students from wearing "niqab"while
attending public schools is constitutional; the court ruled that the decree did not interfere with any fundamental requirement of Islam. On this case, see also Nathan J.
Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, Supreme ConstitutionalCourt of Egypt on Islamic Law,
Veiling and Civil Rights: An Annotated Translationof Supreme ConstitutionalCourt
of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 21 Aim. U. INT'L L. REV. 437
(2006). See also Case 7, Judicial Year 8, issued May 15, 1993 [SCCDC, Vol. 5, Part 2, p
2601, on enhancing rights of a divorced woman and her children by authorizing the
legislator to freely regulate measured alimony according to the best interest of the
society. Similarly, in Case 29, Judicial Year 11, issued Mar. 26, 1994 [SCCDC, Vol. 6,
p 2311, the court enforced the father to make payments to the mother dating back to
about twenty years for her guardianship of their infant child. For more analysis on
the SCC ruling on Islamic cases, see Clark B. Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of
ConstitutionalLaw in Egypt: The Constitutionalizationof the Sharia in Modern Arab
State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81 (1998); Lama Abu Odeh, Modernizing Muslim
Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043 (2004); Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do ConstitutionsRequiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten
Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the
Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 379 (2006).
11. In a landmark case in constitutional law-making in Egypt, Case 37, Judicial
Year 9, issued May 19, 1990 [SCCDC, Vol. 4, p 256], the court emphasized that the
constitution is the fundamental which lays down the norms, rules and functions of the
regime, and it also guarantees individual rights and liberties, equal treatment before
the law, the right to participate in public life, and reassured the importance of a
multi-party system. Along these lines the court held in Case 56, Judicial Year 6, issued June 21, 1986 [SCCDC, Vol. 3, p 353], that excluding certain categories of
citizens from the political process was unconstitutional. See also Case 23, Judicial
Year 8, issued Apr. 15, 1989 [SCCDC, Vol. 4, p 205], on restricting candidacy for public office to political parties, and ruled that exclusion of independent candidates from
becoming members of representative assemblies is unconstitutional.
12. In Case 3, Judicial Year 1, issued June 25, 1983 [SCCDC, Vol. 2, p 155],
struck down legislation which provided that farm land can be taken by the government without compensation, that it violates the owner private property and thereby
imposing a form of confiscation, and thus is unconstitutional. Similarly, the court explored along these lines in Case 1, Judicial Year 1, issued Mar. 2, 1985 [SCCDC, Vol.
3, p 1611, the legal and rational basis for safeguarding the right of private property as
an incentive for progressive activity by individuals as well as being a source of national wealth, thus the court prohibited nationalization unless it is for public interest,
in accordance with law, and suitable compensation. Likewise, in Case 22, Judicial
Year 12, [Official Gazette No 3, Jan. 1, 1994] the court noted the limits within which
private property is to be protected with regard to the lease and sale of premises and
the regulation of the relationship between the lessor and lessee. On cases pertinent to
dismantling rent control in residential buildings, see Case 44, Judicial Year 17, issued
Feb. 22, 1997 [SCCDC, Vol. 8, p 394], allowing tenants' relatives to inherent the tenancy contract; in Case 71, Judicial Year 19, issued Oct. 4, 1997 [SCCDC, Vol. 8, p
876], the court allowed tenants to exchange their tenancies in rental units.
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new millennium when it moved aggressively and appointed a series
of presidents to the court that came from the heart of the regime,
some of whom had worked hard in previous capacities to undo the
work of the court during the 1990s. 13
So the once promising light emanating from the SCC no longer
shimmered and its full-of-hope politicians-cum-lawyers crowding its
hallways withdrew to the background, tail between their legs; briefs
returned to briefcases and the international in human rights agenda
back to the international.
B. In the Nature of the (Authoritarian)Beast
"Of course, it's dead, what do you expect?", one can hear the
reader scream! "Egypt lives under the reign of an authoritarian regime! Whoever thought that the rule of law and rights based
constitutionalism could even be possible in such a system? Isn't that a
contradiction in terms?? It is amazing that the SCC survived for as
long as it did!" And so indeed is the story of the rise and fall of the
SCC typically told: following the collapse of its economy and the accumulation of its debt to international creditors, an authoritarian
regime heeding the advice of the World Bank, establishes a constitutional court. The role of the court is to reassure potential foreign
investors that their property rights will be protected. The SCC did
exactly that, the story is told, but did much more than that. And it is
the "more" that was its undoing. The court pushed too hard and challenged the regime in directions it hadn't foreseen (liberalizing the
political).14 While the calculation of the World Bank economists providing the advice was that protection of private property (i.e., the
market economy) would lead to the domino effect of rule of law, economic growth and inevitably democracy, this didn't exactly pan out in
the Egyptian case. Why is that? Well, because these economists, the
wisdom goes, missed two facts: one about the nature of courts (judges
tend to usurp autonomy for themselves making the outcome of their
decisions unpredictable for the regime); and one about the nature of
authoritarian regimes (they tend to "eat their babies": even onceupon-a-time-useful courts are expendable when the power of the regime is at stake). 15 And so instead of a domino effect, we have rule of
law interruptus.
13. In 1998, Awad al-Murr, the Chief Justice of the Court, under whose presidency the court delivered most of its liberalizing jurisprudence, retired and was
replaced by Chief Justice Muhammad Wali al-Din Galal. In 2001 and after, the retirement of CJ Galal, Fathi Nagib became Chief Justice of the Court, a "man who held the
second most powerful post in the Ministry of Justice . . . [and] had drafted the vast
majority of the government's illiberal legislation." See Moustafa, supra note 2, at 19899.
14. See Moustafa, supra note 2, at 178 - 218.
15. See generally BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD, supranote 9. See
also Moustafa, supra note 2, at 219-37.
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C. An Alternative Account of the History of the SCC
This Article provides an alternative, almost reverse, account of
the rise and fall of the SCC. It does so by reading the history of the
SCC backwards, so to speak, i.e., by reading the past of the court
through its present.16 It is the post-court that tells the story of the
court in its heyday most accurately. The conventional account of the
SCC considers the capture of the court's presidency by the regime to
be a significant event, the aftermath of which is not worth telling.
After all, once the death bell of the rule of law tolls, what is there to
say?
What is notable, however, is that, as human rights activists
withdrew to the background and the SCC's light no longer shimmered, new actors took the political/legal stage. Those new actors
seem to replace the old trio of SCC, human rights activists/political
opposition and government, embodying in their presence and list of
demands a radical critique of the era of the SCC that had been heralded by its fans as a new and welcome dawn in Egypt. Those new
actors, I argue, hint at what was grossly missing in our consideration
of the era of the SCC. Egypt is rocked by labor protests. Every day, it
seems, a new local site of labor protest comes to the fore with protestors demanding pay raise, free lunch, break time, paid leave, safe
work conditions, cessation of gender inequality, etc. The faces of the
leaders of those highly localized but numerous protests are unfamiliar just as those of the protestors themselves. What is notable about
these sites of protest is an absence and a presence: the absence is that
of the human rights activists that had carried briefcases and crowded
the hallways of the SCC in the 1990s; they just don't seem to be
there. The presence? Representatives from the Egyptian security services negotiating with these local (unheard-of-before) leaders and
often making concessions to the protestors.1 7
So what is the meaning of this shift and what exactly does it tell
us about the SCC?
16. The "present" is a reference to the time after the court's retreat but before the
revolution of 2011.
17. In his article on "Security and Politics," an article posted on the website of the
Democratic Front Party, illustrates the reciprocal relations between the State and the
Security forces under Mubarak, and shows how the failure of the State increases the
power of the Security forces as an alternative ruler. Thus the absence of the political
leadership during the labor strikes brings the security forces to fill the vacuum by
running the negotiations with the striking labor on behalf of the state. See http://
www.democraticfront.orglindex2.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=173&pop=
1&page=0 (last visited July 20, 2011). On the role of the security forces as the main
negotiator with the striking labor, see also the report of the Center for Socialist Studies, which enlists several labor protests in different places in Egypt, pointing out the
negotiations that took place between the labor and the security forces, available at
http://www.e-socialists.net/node/999 (last visited July 20, 2011).
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With all the excitement that surrounded the court in its heyday,
very few seemed to appreciate the radicalism of its agenda and if they
did, their judgment of the SCC's radicalism was misplaced. The
(mis)place of the excitement for the court seems to have been its jurisprudence on "the political." The rulings the court delivered during
that period (i.e., the 1990s) improved the bargaining power of the
human rights activists/political opposition vis a vis the government
and this seemed to incense the regime. It is this rage that suggested
that the court's radicalism was located in the "political." Sure enough,
some were disappointed that the court didn't go further than it did by
declaring "security and emergency courts"' 8 unconstitutional, but
everybody understood that the margins of maneuver for a constitutional court in an authoritarian regime were limited especially if it
wanted to stay in action.
In fact, however, the place of the SCC's radicalism was its economic jurisprudence: its rulings on taxes (highly libertarian),
agricultural reforms (reversing them), tenancy on residential buildings (reversing rent control), privatization of public sector companies
(re-interpreting a "socialist" constitution to approve of it), reversing
the effects of past nationalization and sequestration of property (forcing government to pay market value for sequestered or nationalized
property), etc. These rulings are radical because they had a massive
redistributive impact and ultimately pushed the regime to a precipice: on the one hand, the rulings lead to the creation of economic
losers (peasants, tenants, workers, surplus non-workers) who were
not too happy with their new diminished status, and on the other, the
rulings, by chipping away at government's precious revenue, undermined the ability of the government to control the ire of those
economic losers through "law and order."19 While the Mubarak re18. See Nathan Brown, Michael Dunne & Amr Hamzawy, Egypt's Controversial
Constitutional Amendments, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar.
23, 2007, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egyptconstitution
webcommentary0l.pdf (last visited July 19, 2011). See also NATHAN BRoWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIc LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002).

19. Supreme Constitutional Court rulings on property rights claims had
drained state coffers of billions of Egyptian pounds. Pending cases on the
SCC docket had the further potential to make the early property rights rulings pale by comparison. Most significant were ninety-two petitions on the
Court docket contesting a variety of provisions of the sales tax law. Minister
of Justice Seif al-Nasr estimated that pending rulings could cost the state up
to YE 7.7 billion (approximately $2.3 billion). The Constitution Court was
effectively fulfilling its mandate of protecting property rights against governmental infringements, but would the government continue to abide by its
ruling? The answer to the question came in 1998 with the first concrete
struggle over Supreme Constitutional Court independence. In July of that
year, the government attempted to protect itself from pending challenges in
the sphere of taxation. Mubarak issued a presidential decree that restricted
retroactive compensation claims as the result of SCC taxation rulings to the
party initiating the constitutional petition.
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gime created the SCC in the first place to do exactly all of the above,
i.e., introduce a market economy full force, the SCC's consecutive unrelenting judicial whippings in that direction put the regime face to
face with the terrifying impact of these rulings, tying its hands in a
doubled sense: producing losers, and disabling the government to
deal with them effectively. 20
D. A Demonic Trade-off Redistribution as the Concern of the
AuthoritarianRegime, Rule of Law as the Concern of the
Left
What seems odd is that while the tug of war over the political
jurisprudence of the court was taking place in the 1990s, whose
much-too-much sung heroes were human rights activists, it was only
the government that was staring the redistributive impact of the economic jurisprudence in the eye, in the form of a "law and order"
problem. While the court was mired in its battle with the regime, the
issue that gripped everybody's attention-from activists, to parties of
the opposition, to commentators-was the question of the court's autonomy threatened by the regime's resistance to political
liberalization. While the court's economic jurisprudence was piling up
classes of losers, all eyes turned to the SCC's loss of autonomy as the
most terrible of all possible losses. 2 1 The opposition and its allies, it
seems, were only interested in one loser: the SCC (the producer of the
losers whose interests they were supposed to represent in the political!).The effect of all this? An odd and demonic, albeit indirect, tradeoff: the opposition transfers the concerns over wealth distribution to
the regime (in the name of law and order), while the regime transfers
the concerns over the security of the market economy (indirectly) to
the opposition and human rights community (in the name of rule of
law!).
Some commentators have noted the regime's ingenious device of
introducing private property as a court-based initiative thereby projecting its will to liberalize the economy unto the court, transferring
See Moustafa, supra note 2, at 179.
20. The capacity of the government to manage discontent through increased security-based repression and/or through symbolic welfare hand-outs was undermined
by the loss of revenue. Supra note 19.
21. Moustafa illustrates how the civil society, i.e., opposition, the legal profession,
human right groups and NGOs, became the "judicial support network" for the SCC,
which was perceived as the most promising avenues to promote a political reform
agenda. Hence, the civil society shifted its strategy to constitutional litigation, where
the SCC provided an effective and successful avenue in challenging the regime and
defending their interests. Moustafa argues that constitutional litigation besides challenging the regime legislation it aimed to expand the legal foundation of the civil
society itself. The exclusive dependency of the civil society on litigation made their
focal point to protect the SCC independence. See Moustafa, supra note 2.
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blame to it for the consequences. 22 In fact, for the economic losers,
losing through constitutional interpretation was only one side of the
pincer inside which they found themselves caught; the other side was
the substitution on the part of the opposition (especially the left) of
the call for justice with that for the rule of law! One might say therefore that it is through turning a blind eye to issues of distribution
generated by the court and preoccupation with the court's autonomy
that rule of law as a left agenda was initiated in Egypt. One was
given up for the other, or one might say, that the dark side of the
"rule of law" for Egypt was "the in-justice of private property." And
since the issues that brought the question of the court's autonomy to
the fore were related to the court's political jurisprudence (constitutionalizing the trappings of democracy), one might add that the dark
side of "democracy" for Egypt is "the in-justice of private property."
E.

Tightening the Interpretive Noose: Amending the Constitution

In 2007, the regime amended the constitution to abolish all references to socialism (also significantly narrowing down avenues of
political participation). While the SCC, in the heyday of its autonomy, and before the introduction of these amendments, performed
interpretive acrobatics to introduce market economy in its decisions
against the letter of an openly "socialist" constitution, now, a much
less autonomous court has the constitution on its side so to speak.
Today, economic losers are face to face with private property without
the song and dance of rule of law constitutionalism much as the political losers are face to face with authoritarianism without the song
22. By 1979, the year that the Supreme Constitutional Court was created, total
external debt had reached $15.4 billion, and debt servicing consumed fifty-one percent
of all export earnings. The Egyptian economy was a virtual time bomb, and the political survival of the regime hung in the balance. The specter of the 1977 food riots was
on the mind of Sadat as he searched for more ways to attract foreign investment. It
was in this context that the new Supreme Constitutional court was established on
August 29, 1979. Mahmud Fahmy, one of the main architects of the economic opening
and member of the committee that drew up the first draft of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law, recalled that
the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court was really the result
of internal and external pressure. From inside, the legal profession was
pushing and they were very upset about the old Supreme Court because it
was really a tool to legitimize the government's acts and views and it was not
an independent body. But more importantly, from the outside there was
pressure from foreign investors and even the foreign embassies. They all
said, "you are crying for investments to come but under what circumstances
and with what protections?"
Fahmy concluded that "the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court was
part of a bundle of legislative reform at the time. It [the establishment of SCC1 was
intended by Sadat to keep the foreign investors at ease." See Moustafa, supra note 2,
at 77. See also Adel Omar Sherif & Nathan J. Brown, Judicial Independence in the
Arab World, Program of Arab Governance of the UNDP (2002), available at http://
www.undp-pogar.org/publications/index.asp?tid=9&src=1&type=&so=O (last visited
July 19, 2011).
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and dance of the rule of law constitutionalism (witness the emergency/terrorism laws). The difference is that much commentary is
founded on the latter and hardly any on the former.
Come the representative of Egyptian security services negotiating directly with leaders of labor protests.
F.

Critique of the Court
1. An Alternative Fairy Tale Scenario

Let us imagine for a moment that the opposite had taken place.
Instead of liberalizing the economic sphere to suit the agenda of the
regime and its international financial sponsors, and using the credit
it accumulated in the process to liberalize the political realm, the
SCC constitutionalized the regime's hold on the latter (kept political
party laws, electoral laws, censorship laws, etc., intact) but used such
credit to properly "socialize" the economy in a way that corresponds
with the letter of the constitution (before its amendment in 2007). In
other words, let us imagine that the SCC decided that what should
have been a properly distributive and representative constitution
was rendered inoperative by a corporatist regime that transformed
the institutions of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) into
state capitalism without industrialization (i.e., failed ISI).23
To explore fully the implications of this imaginary scenario, it is
worth first asserting that the strategy by the real SCC of nurturing
the human rights activist community so that it comes to the court's
defense if it were threatened by the regime, as one commentator put
it, had a deep dark side 24 : human rights activists fashioned themselves and planned their interventionist agendas after the court's
jurisprudence, pushing the jurisprudence only in areas they thought
the court would be sympathetic to (civil and political rights) and
shied away from those they learned, the hard way, would be met with
little sympathy from the court (the economic, specifically representing the economic losers of the introduction of neoliberalism in the
economy by the court). Consequently, one can confidently state that
23. Many countries, including Egypt, who had adopted ISI as an economic strategy relying on public sector-led industrialization, ended up not only failing to
industrialize but also transforming the public sector into a place of corruption and
enrichment for state elites, "state capitalism." The political regime that oversees the
failure of ISI is typically an authoritarian one that relies on "corporatized" political
entities, i.e., parties, unions and associations that are either dominated by the regime
or affiliated with it. See in general ANNE 0. KRUEGER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993).
24. Moustafa argues that by 1997 the constitutional litigation strategy that successfully managed to defend human rights became the dominant strategy. Actually,
the SCC encouraged human rights cases through its liberal decisions. However, attempts to safeguard the last vestige of Nasser-era economic rights for the poor were
marginalized, since the activists knew that the possibilities of successfully defending
these rights through the SCC are slim. See Moustafa, supra note 2, at 145- 54.
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the SCC made its human rights groups and didn't exactly find them.
It is as if the SCC split off part of itself and deposited it in the human
rights constituency that litigated before it, mirroring thereby itself
back to itself. And so what the court didn't offer in jurisprudence it
didn't get in human rights litigation and vice versa. It is true that
around the particular jurisprudence/human rights cluster that ensued, a great deal of excitement was created, a certainje ne sais quoi,
of hopeful possibility and a waiting to exhale, but it is also true that
what was absent from the cluster was equally telling of the court.
In the alternative fairy tale scenario, the court would garner a
different set of litigants and a different gendarme of activists. It
would be approached by plaintiffs/human rights activists representing farmers litigating the unfair price at which the government was
buying their agricultural products and the unconstitutional criteria
used for agricultural loans by government-owned agricultural banks;
or factory workers litigating the unconstitutional measurement of
their wages especially with regard to profits generated by factories of
the public sector where they work and relative to profits and salaries
recouped by (corrupt) management; by the poor of the "random"
neighborhoodS 25 litigating the lack of public infrastructure, a la lettre
of the constitution, of (sewage, water, roads) in their neighborhoods,
etc. In this imaginary (fairy tale) alternative scenario, we would have
seen a completely different human rights activist emerge responding
to a substantively different type of constitutional jurisprudence. One
can imagine such an activist birthed from the bosom of left politics in
Egypt using rule of law constitutionalism to undo a system of legislation/state organization that has "corporatized" the left2 6 and
"capitalized" the public sector. 2 7 That is not to say that the SCC
would not have been "shut down" soon enough by having its autonomy usurped, as it really happened. But the political consequences, I
would wager, would look different after the demise of this imaginary
SCC.
The difference would be twofold: first, the left would not find itself purchasing rule of law at the expense of its natural constituents
(peasants, workers, the poor) as happened with the real SCC, trans25. "Random" neighborhood or "Ashwaiyyat" is a reference to informal slums

emerging on public or private property in big urban centers in Egypt, living outside
the reach of municipal regulation, whose inhabitants survive on economic transactions that are not recognized or accounted for by the formal economy of the state. See
Ninette Fahmi, A Cultureof Poverty or the Poverty of a Culture? Informal Settlements
and the Debate over the State-Society Relationshipin Egypt, 58 (4) MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 597 (2004).
26. See JOEL BEININ, THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN EGYPr 26 -66 (2010).
27. Many economies of the public sector failed in the developing world because
the national elites turned it into their own private "capital" through endemic corruption. Likewise in Egypt who capitalized the public sector, see JOHN WATERBURY, THE
EGYPT OF NASSER AND SADAT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF Two REGIMES 51 (1983); See
Cypher & Dietz, supra note 4, at 253-58.
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forming itself into a mouthpiece for neo-liberalism (by default) via the
rule of law route; and second, the uproar created by the demise of the
SCC would have been louder and greater as its demise would have
been associated with, and symbolic of, the demise of social groups
who would have had a taste of the constitution on their side, no matter how brief the experience might have been. In other words, instead
of the SCC's champions being brief-case-carrying, foreign-funding-dependent, social-base-deprived, easily-dispensable human rights
activists, the supporters of the imaginary court would have been
blocks of disenfranchised social groups whose mobilization by the
court had given them the kind of social power the regime would have
felt the need to contend with. Instead of departing with a peep, the
imaginary SCC would have, I imagine, departed with a bang.
2.

The Trouble with the Real SCC

With the fairy tale scenario in mind, we can locate the theoretical
and political bias of the real SCC (and its class of commentator fans).
The court's background assumption is that the market (private property) is both the proper form of democracy and its grand rule. And so,
when the court through a series of decisions undoes "the distortion" of
this rule from the previous historical eras (the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) era of the Egyptian economy), it not only proceeds to fix the economic incentives, it also gives democracy its
natural form. But what if the proper place of the political democratic
is precisely the opposite: the act of denaturalizing private property,
which in the case of Egypt has taken the form of state-property-cumprivate-property (a failed ISI state)? We thus come to the conclusion
that what undid the real SCC was the economics of its political jurisprudence (the market is the natural form of democracy) and the
politics of its economic jurisprudence (the political demobilization of
the economic losers). It is the latter that made the demobilization of
the SCC itself the grand non-event of Egypt.
PART Two:

THE LIMIT OF

CLS

APPLIED TO THE

A.

ANALYSIS OF LAW AS

SCC

Rule of Law as the Faith of the Left / the SCC Acting Cynically

For distributional consequences to be the concern of the regime,
because of their impact on the regime's security interests, and for the
left to adopt a rule of law agenda at the expense of concern for distributional outcome, raises several questions as to the relationship
between law, politics and ideology 2 8 in the context of a post-develop28. By ideology I mean the means through which
a dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them
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mental authoritarian state like Egypt (failed ISI embracing neoliberalism as the answer). These questions force us to tread on unfamiliar ground especially if we have the United States (a postindustrial capitalist democracy) in mind.
What strikes us in the comparison is that whereas in the case of
the United States, the left performs the role of ideology critique in its
approach to law to unmask its distributive impact and to de-center
the dominant faith in the rule of law, in Egypt we find that faith in
the rule of law is unmoored from its familiar dominant ideological
status becoming mainly the faith of the left. This uncouples the left
from its historical task (ideology critique) for two reasons: it is the left
that has internalized the magical powers of the rule of law (i.e., opted
for the illusion) and the illusion remains embattled (has yet to become hegemonic, thereby achieving the status of the ideological). 2 9 In
other words, who would do the critique and critique of what?
Moreover, why, what would be the point? In contrast to the situation in the United States, where ideology masks distributional
stakes, the important role of critique, distributional stakes of the
SCC's decisions fall where they may without any cover. By the time
they hit the ground and before they go running, the government's
arm reaches out and softens the fall in the name of security.3 0
Exacerbating this paradox is the fact that those who are making
the rules (the judges of the SCC) are not the ones holding the faith in
the rule of law. In fact, quite the opposite; strong textual and anecdotal evidence suggests that they are perfectly aware of what they are
doing: manipulating the constitution to get the result they want. One
doesn't even have to go down the route of searching for evidence of
such cynicism. When the rule of law (of property) era is initiated
through the establishment of a constitutional court, whose role it is to
interpret a document such as the constitution where indeterminacy
runs wild (especially if it's also socialist a la lettre before the 2007
amendment), it would be hard to imagine such a court in the grip of
faith (bad or good). The SCC was loyally answering the historical call.
The fact that it surprised the regime with its assault on its political
self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but
systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself.
Such "mystification" as it is commonly known, frequently takes the form of
masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which arises conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions. In any actual
ideological formation, all six of these strategies are likely to interact in complex ways.
See

TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUcTION 5-6 (1991).

29. While the faith in the Rule of Law is popular as the Egyptian revolution has
clearly shown, it has yet to be adopted by a recognized "dominant power" through
which it legitimates, naturalzes and universalizes its interests.
30. The government does so by either increasing repression or making distributive concessions or both.
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tranquility does not deny that fact, it simply adds an interesting
wrinkle.
Perhaps confronting one's power without the mediation of faith
regresses one back to infancy, for on close reading of many of the
Court's decisions, especially those on taxes in which the court proceeds to annul millions of dollars of revenue for the government
based on tenuous textual support, one can't help but notice foolish
play. It is the kind of foolish play that comes from doing politics without taking responsibility, ruling without ruling. Children may very
well be the biggest cynics: wreaking havoc, acting omnipotently and
yet, maybe even as a result, adored.
Comes Mommy 3 mopping the floor ...
B.

Security: Ideology and its Critique Combined

In contrast to the role that ideology plays in the United States,
naturalizing the distributional fall-out, "security considerations" in
Egypt are designed to confront distributional stakes head on. Indeed
the genius of "security" is that it acts as an ideology substitute (denaturalize what you like, just don't act on it) while also making ideological critique superfluous (distributional fall out is the concern of
security). Political scientists like to assert that because authoritarian
regimes are deprived of the legitimacy of democratic process (form)
they have to rely on the legitimation of distribution (substance) to
retain their hold on power. 3 2 But of course, there is always a surplus
of grievance, especially when the transition to private property
wreaks havoc among traditional beneficiaries. In this case, "security"
has to step in to perform the role of ideology, albeit with a difference:
instead of inserting itself in the interstices of your brain the way ideology does, it inserts itself in the interstices of institutions, to make
sure grievances that may exist remain just that: grievances. It promotes and it demotes, it renders famous and renders invisible, it pats
on the shoulders and tortures in the groins, it enriches and it exiles. 33
It is ideology physicalized, embodied. Rather than relying on its absence to be effective, it is eminently and openly present. It doesn't
want you to believe, it knows that you don't: it just wants you to hold
still.
31. See supra note 11.
32. See generally BRIAN DowNING, MILITARY REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY AND AUTOCRACY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1993); CARL J.
FRIEDRICH, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1965); RALPH K. WHITE, AuTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: AN EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY (1960); RULE BY LAw: JUDICIAL
POLITICS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
33. Younis argues that the security forces can not exercise its political role on
legal grounds but by direct coercion or indirectly through state related / dependent
institutions. See SHERIF YOUNIS, ISTIKLAL EL-QADAA' [INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY] 52 (2007).
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This command at a distance to be met by holding still is what
makes "security" both heavy and empty at the same time. Its command is heavy (don't or else) but it is also empty because it is
indifferent to what you really think. Compare that to ideological interpellation in the United States: it is light yet full. It wants your
mind, fills you up and so acquires the lightness of your private being.
It is you!
C.

The Open Scandal is not so much Legal Indeterminacy but
Lack of Judicial Autonomy

And so the open secret in Egypt is not so much the indeterminacy
of the legal text, i.e., that ideology influences the interpretive work of
the judge, as is the case in the United States. It is rather that the
judge was appointed and/or promised rewards and/or intimidated by
security services and/or allowed security considerations to influence
his decisions. In other words, the open secret in Egypt is that this
universal judge allowed his technocratic skills to be spoiled and
stained by "security considerations." 34 Whereas in the United States,
the rebellious judge is the one who (always secretly) abandons his
"bad faith"35 and submits to ideological influence without the mediation of bad conscience, and self-consciously manipulates the text
(within the constraints of that remainder of determinacy, of course).
In Egypt, the rebellious judge, by contrast, is one who resists influence by either staring the displeasure of the security services in his
rulings in the face (risking loss of rewards, demotion, transfer), or
rebels against his situation and that of his colleagues writ large. In
the second instance, the judge is a true hero protesting the system in
toto. In a Superman-like fashion, he takes off his technocratic uniform and dons in its stead a rather strange, tight and uncomfortable
garb: the political.
Taking to the streets, the judge protests vehemently the interference of security forces within his work (and is of course met by an
adoring public).3 6 This excursion into the political is tolerated only
because it is understood (by the adoring public) to be temporary and
34. Younis raises the question, are the Judges' demand for the independence of
the judiciary regarded as politics? And are judges politicized? And immediately he
notes that to some extent the answer is positive. Furthermore, he argues that they
should be under the circumstances of authoritarianism. See id., at 60-66.
35. "Bad faith" refers to a type of consciousness shared by judges whereby they
deny to others as well as to themselves that they are adjudicating "ideologically." See
DUNCAN KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 191-212 (1998).
36. Two activist judges published an article under the title "When Judges are
Beaten," addressing their protest, demands and democratic aspirations. See Mahmud
Mekki & Hisham Bastawisi, When Judges are Beaten, THE GUARDIAN, May 10, 2006,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/may/10/comment.egypt
(last visited July 20, 2011). See also NATHAN BROWN & HESHAM NASR, EGYPT'S JUDGES
STEPS FORWARD: THE JUDICIAL ELECTION BoYcuTT AND EGYPTIAN REFORM (2005). For
further details about the Judges protest, see BBC news, May 25, 2006, on "Egyptian
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coerced. The protesting judge is out there righting the wrong of external influence, despite his best judgment and against the grain of his
professional training, "but hey, somebody has to do it!" Once the protest is over, it is understood by all that our heroic judge will return to
his chambers, put his judicial robe and technocratic gloves back on,
and return to his natural calling. This is how terrible the rule of security is: it forces technocrats to become political, to be thrown out to
suffer the merciless sun of the political when their pale genteel judicial skin could not otherwise tolerate it.
As in the example of the heroic judge above, the popular struggle
for judicial autonomy in Egypt is sustained by the belief that the
obverse of the technocratic is the political. What needs to be vehemently resisted and what stands in the way of Egypt becoming a
modern state, it is widely believed especially among the left, is that
security meddles, indeed inserts itself inside the state's institutional
structures, most terribly in the case of the judiciary, whose ideal role
is to act as the objective and neutral arbiter of disputes between individuals, and between individuals and the government.3 8 Yet, spend
any time in Egypt and you quickly come to the conclusion that in the
context of Egypt, the technocratic does not act as the obverse of the
political, in the sense of its opposite. Instead, it is the other form in
which the political appears, its exchangeable identical twin. It has
been often noted by political scientists that authoritarian rulers of
the Arab world go out of their way to ground their rule in law.39 In a
universe where ideology is thin and "security considerations" fill the
remaining void, the technocratic short-circuits its way to the political
(and vice versa) without the lubricating role of the ideological as is
the case in the United States. And it is this disavowed third term, the
ideological, that sustains, in my view, the distinction in the case of
the United States and makes the political a real risk for the technoJudges come out in force" available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle-east/
5017508.stm (last visited July 19, 2011).
37. YouNis, supra note 33, at 62.
38. Id.
39. Brown shows how the Arab authoritarian regimes appeal to constitutional
principles in the effort to make the regimes more accountable. He demonstrates how
rulers can use rule of law to strengthen their rule. See BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN
THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 9. Some called the Arab authoritarian regimes a "liberalized Autocracy"; see Daniel Brumberg, Democratization in the Arab World? The
Trap of Liberalized Autocracy, 13 (4) JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 56 (Oct. 2002). In his
article, Brumberg argues:
Liberalized autocracy has proven far more durable than once imagined. The
trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective
repression in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait is not just a "survival strategy" adopted by the authoritarian regimes, but rather a type of
political system whose institutions, rule, and logic defy any linear model of
democratization.
Id., at 56.
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cratic, its de-legitimating stain. Critical Legal Scholars have often
insisted, against the grain of popular fiction, that their claim is not
that Law is Politics (that judges rule on political grounds), but rather
that ideological influences insert themselves in the interpretive work
of the judge especially when the judicial experience of textual constraint is at its weakest. In fact, ideological influence is the very
condition for the emergence of judicial autonomy: it is through denying its work that members of the judiciary come to acquire their
unique consciousness as a professional class, their universalized bad
faith, their autonomy from the political.
Perhaps the tragedy of the Egyptian judiciary is not so much
that its appointment is tainted by the approval of security services,
instead (and even in cases when it's not) it is that "security" as a
mediating term between the legal and the political is both too heavy
and too empty to allow the judiciary the bliss of denial. As I mentioned above, security considerations can be summed up by the
command "don't!" By not aspiring to fill the mind of judges with anything (except perhaps terror), it has deprived them of the work that
comes with denial of influence. And without (partial) denial there is
no judicial autonomy. The irony is that a heroic judge can protest on
the street the pernicious influence of security services on their work,
but the heavy emptiness of "security considerations" as an ideology
substitute cannot be protested against. It is structural to the system,
specifically to its political economy.
PART THREE: SECURITY AS AN IDEOLOGY SUBSTITUTE:

A

HISTORY

Authoritarianism in the Arab world is often referred to in mystical terms. While authoritarianism abounds in the world, we are told,
the uninterrupted and obstinate quality of this system in the Arab
case is decidedly unique. 40 Latin America has turned democratic, Africa has had its brush with serious democratic experimentation, and
half of Asia is democratic (India alone!), but not the Arab world! Sure
enough, Arab regimes introduce identifiably democratic practices and
institutions (elections, parliaments, constitutional courts, human
rights commissions, freedom of the press laws, etc.), but every time
gestures of this sort are made and before anybody exhales, they are
quickly withdrawn, recast, reinterpreted. Soon enough it transpires
that these trappings are nothing but a ruse of a given regime, halfhearted maneuvers by the state elites, designed to either steer a transition in the economy of sorts that seemed threatening to the regime's
hold on power; or to respond to external pressure so that the regime,
rather than introducing new means for power turnover, can retain its
power by changing its ways of governance. Democratic institutions,
40. Some called it "Arab political exceptionalism"; see Larry Diamond, Why are
there no Arab Democracies?, 21 (1) JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 93 (Jan. 2010).
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rather than being the negation of authoritarian rule, turn out to be,
over and over again, its new form.
The reason I call this account mystical (mystifying, mystified,
especially misty) is because it locates the property of "authoritarianism" outside the political economy as it moves on historically
(contrary to popular wisdom, history does its work even in Arabia). In
a previous article, I argued that in Egypt three political economies
are being staged: (failed) ISI economy turned neo-liberal with intermittent intervention of rentierism.4 1
While ISI as a developmental strategy was premised on the idea
that the rise of the urban industrial working class would come at the
expense of the peasant (whose goods sold to government were discounted), this only took place after the peasant came upon an asset
(land) that he didn't own before, i.e., as a result of the agricultural
(land) reforms of the early 1950s, 42 accompanied by government subsidized agricultural loans, seeds, equipment, damn water, etc. 4 3
"Nationalist socialism" as mobilizational ideology seemed at the time
to have a rational basis in its distributional approach-the pie was on
its face fairly distributed. Failed ISI was symptomatized by the failure of the emergence of competitive industrialization leading to
affluent urbanization and mechanization of the countryside, as originally planned. The emergent wealth of the state elites (managing
corruptly the expanded public sector of the ISI) came in conjunction
with the rude interruption of the upward mobility of the urban and
newly educated (in state schools and colleges) working class as well
as increasing impoverishment of the rural peasants. Slowly but
surely a reciprocal encroachment took place: the impoverished city
encroaching on the failed countryside and an impoverished peasantry
encroaching on an unemployed urban space creating the peasant urban slums of Al-Ashwaiyyaat (the random neighborhoods). The
notable gap in wealth between the few (state elites and those fortunate enough to be incorporated in their patronage network) and the
many (everybody else) became a serious stain on the credibility of the
system. An ideological void occurred: nationalist socialism lost its rationalizing power.
If an ideological void is created when the gap in wealth is naked
to the consciousness of the national audience, the void has to find a
filler if political rule can achieve stability. An alternative to the ideol41. See generally Lama Abu Odeh, On Law and the Transition to Market: The
Case of Egypt, 23 EMORY INr'L L. REv. 351-81 (2009).
42. See HAMID ANSARI, EGYPT: THE STALLED SOCIETY 79-87 (1986); T. Khattab,
Land Law, in EGYPT AND ITS LAWS 126-27 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron & Baudouin
Dupret eds., 2002).
43. See GALAL A. AMIN, EGYP's ECONOMIC PREDICAMENT: A STUDY IN THE INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL PRESSURE, POLITICAL FOLLY, AND SOCIAL TENSION IN EGYPT,

1960-90 (1995).
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ogy void filler would of course be to fill the wealth gap itself.
Socialism comes closest to this instance, in my view, but so does
rentierism, the strange and opposite twin of socialism. It is a prevailing economic system in the Arab world, with its representative
instance in Egypt, although on a reduced scale. In the rentier model,
the government budget has access to revenue through sale in international markets of a highly strategic commodity such as oil (in the case
of Egypt, it also includes Egypt's geopolitical importance to the
United States yielding it USAID money, as well as revenue from the
Suez canal) that requires a minimum of labor, domestic or international, to produce it. This produces the phenomenon of "bounty
capitalism": rather than closing the wealth gap, as its strange twin
socialism would do, it rewards its essentially non-laboring nationals
in a way a socialist system would (needs met from the cradle to the
grave), while still creating the outrageously wealthy few (as is most
noticeable in Saudi Arabia). Rentierism acts as a socialist state distributionally by virtue of the size of its revenue while still producing
capitalist effects (wealth disparity) with the important added complexity that it does so without the mediation of local labor. 4 4 The lack
of mediation of local labor makes the connection to the state direct
and unmediated by ideology. Put differently, the non-laboring citizen
of a rentier state demands distribution directly from the state, as a
citizen, and the state, owner of wealth, giveth and taketh away without obligation towards its citizens as producers. Its bounty is
therefore experienced by the citizens as both arbitrary and undeserved at the same time, i.e., almost mystical. Just as the source of
the wealth itself (oil) seemed to fall from the sky (or rather flow from
earth) like manna from heaven (or fountains of black liquid), so does
the state in giving and withholding-it acts as mysteriously and arbitrarily as the God that randomly chose the people of Arabia to enjoy
His manna.
The rentier aspect of the Egyptian economy was not substantial
enough as a share of the over all economy to allow the regime to make
a secure shift to neo-liberalism, by using rentier revenue to compensate or bribe enough of the losers into silence. It was nevertheless
substantial enough to sustain a large civil service workforce (numbering seven million), which, strangely enough, seemed to expand in size
the more the government privatized its public holdings.4 5 The size of
the civil service bribe was for a large number of beneficiaries barely
sufficient to eke out a living, leaving a good part of them (especially
the retirees) to lead an existence on the edge of pauperization. But as
44. See generally NAZIH
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beneficiaries of the state's bounty, they constituted the passive base
of support for the authoritarian regime: support because they feared
real pauperization if they protested; passive, because their income
barely kept up with the rise in prices that came with neo-liberalism.
Their support of the regime was direct and unmediated by ideology,
based on the trade-off of passive consent for precious benefits in a sea
of increasing overall pauperization.
The rest of the discontented? Some traveled as (beggar) migrant
labor to the rest of the Arab world. Through departure, they were
spared the workings of "security considerations" (except on the borders) while their remittances added to the rentier manna the state
could use to silence protest. As for that large remainder of raging discontent, there was the two million people employed by the Egyptian
security forces. They intimidated, threatened, harassed, humiliated,
arbitrarily arrested, jailed, and tortured those who dared protest. If
ideology means a discourse that legitimizes the winnings of the winners in the eyes of the losers, there was little of that to be found.
CONCLUSION

In this article I argued that a court that liberalizes on the economic front and the political one at the same time in the context of an
authoritarian system that is hostile to the Court's autonomy ends up,
by dragging the left in its defense as it struggles to preserve this autonomy, compromising the distributional agenda of this left. What is
given up by the left in agenda gets picked up by the authoritarian
regime as policy necessary to preserve the stability of domination and
control. When distribution moves to the authoritarian regime's side,
it gets articulated as "security consideration" denoting both welfare
concessions to the newly impoverished as a result of the liberalization
of the economy and coercive suppression of dissent on their part. A
court that then adjudicates in the shadow of "security considerations"
is an institution that is a short distance to acting politically no matter
how formalist its legal reasoning might sound. It is a court that reads
the law without the thick buffer of ideology, leaving us as critics of
the court with no "behind" to search for as we study its decisions.
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